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We evaluate explanations for why Germany grew so quickly in the 1950s.  The recent litera-
ture has emphasized convergence, structural change and institutional shake-up while minimiz-
ing the importance of the postwar shock. We show that this shock and its consequences were 
more important than neoclassical convergence and structural change in explaining the rapid 
growth of the West German economy in the 1950s. We find little support for the hypothesis 
of institutional shakeup. This suggests a different interpretation of post-World War II German 
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Understanding West German Economic Growth in the 1950s 
1. Introduction 
  There is no shortage of attempts to explain West Germany’s economic growth 
in the 1950s. With good reason: between 1950 and 1959, GDP rose by nearly 8  per-
cent per annum, faster than anywhere else in Europe and in stark contrast to experi-
ence following World War I. Among European countries, only Austria, which shared 
many circumstances with Germany, came close to matching this performance. Ger-
many’s rapid growth doubled living standards in a decade. By the early 1960s it had 
restored Germany’s status as the largest and potentially most influential economic and 
financial power in Europe.   
  Explanations for this experience are of three types. A first school of thought 
sees West Germany’s fast postwar growth in the context of productivity catching up 
and convergence. The West German economy grew rapidly after World War II, in this 
view, because it finally shed the shackles holding back structural change and produc-
tivity growth.
2 As Table 1 indicates, German GDP per man hour was never as much 
as 75 percent of British GDP per man hour at any point before 1950 but converged to 
British levels in the 1960s.
3 Lower output per worker in the first half of the 20
th cen-
tury reflected a lower economy-wide capital-labor ratio, which in turn reflected the 
disruptions of World War I, the inflationary 1920s and the slump of the early 1930s. 
In addition, Germany’s slow exit from peasant agriculture kept her economy away 
from the efficient frontier, even if in some sectors of manufacturing, Germany sur-
                                                 
2   See for example Abramovitz (1986) and Baumol, Blackman and Wolff (1989). 
3   Britain had been the technological and productivity leader in Europe throughout the 19
th 
century and into the 20
th and remains a useful point of comparison after World War II, as 
we shall see.    3
passed British productivity already before World War I.
4 But there was no intrinsic 
reason why these differentials should persist. Germany could raise labor productivity 
by raising its capital-labor ratio. Inefficient labor could move from agriculture to in-
dustry, where its marginal product was higher, and economy-wide labor productivity 
could be raised to levels like those prevailing in Britain. West Germany’s economic 
growth could outpace Britain’s for the duration of this convergence process.
5 Temple 
(2001) and Temin (2002) advance this interpretation for postwar Western Europe gen-
erally. Temin finds that the larger a country’s share of employment in agriculture – 
his proxy for delayed structural change – the faster its growth. West Germany is sim-
ply a case in point. 
 A  second,  related  school of thought emphasizes institutional reasons for Ger-
many’s growth spurt after World War II. It posits sharp changes in socioeconomic in-
stitutions following World War II in directions conducive to faster growth and to the 
absence of comparable changes in slower growing countries like Britain. Sweeping 
pro-market reforms under U.S. aegis, the argument goes, abolished cartels, reduced 
state intervention and planning, and put the West German economy on a path toward 
European and world market integration. The framework for this analysis is Mancur 
Olson’s (1982) model of the capture of policy by distributional coalitions.
6 It argues 
that long-standing distributional coalitions were dissolved by the war and occupation, 
freeing Germany to enjoy a sustained acceleration in total factor productivity (TFP) 
                                                 
4   This point has been made by authors from Kindleberger (1967) to Broadberry (1997) to 
Temin (2002). Broadberry (2006) also presents evidence of lagging productivity in Ger-
many’s service sector, which points in the same direction. 
5   These were the predictions of the first generation of neoclassical growth theorists (see e.g. 
Solow 1957), whose work, not coincidentally, appeared at just this time. 
6   This framework has been influentially applied to Germany by Giersch et al. (1992). Olson 
himself applied his theory to post-World War II Europe in Olson (1996). Critical views are 
provided by Paqué (1994, 1996) and Carlin (1996).    4
growth, both absolutely and relative to countries like Britain that did not experience 
such rapid institutional change.  
  Members of a third school, in contrast, focus on the negative output shock in 
the final phases of the war and immediately following it. GDP in the three zones of 
Allied occupation that became the Federal Republic was only 64 percent of 1938 lev-
els in 1948. In the UK, in contrast, output was already 13 percent higher in 1948 than 
in the last pre-World War II year.
7 Germany could grow quickly, it follows, because it 
had been pushed off its long-term growth path, but only temporarily. Janossy (1969), 
Abelshauser (1981), and Dumke (1990) argue this point for Europe generally – that 
the larger the drop in output that a country suffered between 1938 and 1950, the faster 
it grew subsequently. Manz (1968), Abelshauser (1975) and Borchardt (1976) make 
the argument specifically for Germany. 
  That these three views all have solid pedigrees suggests that there is probably 
at least a grain of truth in each. The resurgence of neoclassical growth theory has pro-
vided new impetus to the catching-up hypothesis. Temin (2002) has provided a pow-
erful restatement of the delayed-structural-change view. Recent work on the econom-
ics of institutions has made it almost obligatory to emphasize socioeconomic ar-
rangements as determinants of economic growth.
8 In contrast, arguments emphasizing 
the postwar shock have fallen by the wayside. 
  In this paper we argue that this tendency to de-emphasize the postwar shock as 
a determinant of German economic performance in the 1950s has gone too far. Recent 
analyses have understated how dramatically Germany was pushed off of its growth 
path in 1944-46 and the scope this shock opened for TFP growth. Our analysis sug-
                                                 
7   We describe the derivation of these estimates later in the paper.  
8   For the former see Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2005), and for the latter see Hall 
and Soskice (2001).   5
gests that this shock to TFP, together with its subsequent recovery, was vastly more 
important than neoclassical convergence and structural change in explaining differ-
ences between German and British growth in the 1950s.
9   
  If a key explanation for the acceleration in German economic growth in the 
1950s was the country’s ability to recover from the sharp negative shock at the end of 
World War II, the question then is why Germany was so successful in recovering – in 
contrast to experience after World War I. One possibility is changes in the institu-
tional constellation as suggested by Olson. But we show that the discontinuities in 
Germany’s regulatory framework across World War II have been overstated. By to-
day’s standards, West Germany in the 1950s was still a tightly regulated economy 
with an impressive degree of institutional continuity. West Germany’s pro-market re-
forms of 1948 were not a radical departure from the past. Nor do we detect an institu-
tional shakeup that destroyed existing distributional coalitions. Collective bargaining 
and workplace co-determination, the principal mechanisms through which distribu-
tional coalitions had asserted themselves in the Weimar Republic, were quickly rein-
stated. A series of acts passed starting in the early 1950s cemented Germany’s system 
of industrial corporatism, drawing heavily on legislation from the Third Reich. In this 
reshaped form, the regulatory framework of the 1930s survived unscathed through the 
third quarter of the 20
th century and beyond. Contrary to the Olson story, it was this 
very stability of institutional arrangements that facilitated the rapid postwar recovery 
and growth of the German economy. 
  How can we reach such different conclusions from previous investigators? For 
four reasons:  
                                                 
9   This, of course, being the very period for which others argue that convergence and struc-
tural change were most important.    6
•  Based on Maddison’s (1991, 1995) estimates German wartime GDP, we gen-
erate new data on the sources of economic growth during World War II. We 
consider performance during the war rather than simply comparing the last 
prewar and first postwar years and treating the war economy as a black box. 
This enables us to more precisely identify the magnitude of the postwar shock. 
•  We compare these data with the predictions of neoclassical growth theory, 
pinpointing the observable implications of alternative hypotheses.  
•  We place the performance of the economies with which we are concerned in 
longer-term perspective. We do not imagine that history starts in 1950 or 1938 
but go back further in time as a way of helping to identify the economy’s 
growth potential.  
•  Finally, we make detailed use of the Anglo-German comparison. This allows 
us to explore the roles of institutions and policies, using the experience of 
Europe’s historical productivity leader (and post-World War II growth lag-
gard) as a benchmark.
10 
 
2. Comparative evidence on labor productivity and growth accounts 
  The Anglo-German differential persisted through the first half of the 20
th cen-
tury. Table 1 shows that German output per capita and the country’s capital/labor ratio 
remained far behind those of Britain at the end of the 1940s. Germany could grow 
faster, it follows, because she inherited a lower capital/labor ratio, implying lower 
output per worker. In this view, fast growth in the 1950s reflected convergence to the 
                                                 
10  International comparisons like those of Abramovitz (1986), Baumol, Blackman and Wolff 
(1989), and Broadberry (1997) emphasize that Britain had been Europe’s technological 
leader in the 19th century, with its highest output per capita and the highest capital/labor 
ratio.   7
productivity frontier, a process during which investment and growth were higher than 
normal until steady-state levels of output-per-worker and capital-per-worker were 
achieved. 
  The rate of growth of West Germany’s capital stock was indeed higher than in 
Britain: 6 versus 4 percent per annum (see Table 2). This is consistent with the idea 
that convergence helps to explain why Germany was now the faster-growing econ-
omy. But this differential capital-stock growth was too small to explain differences in 
the two countries’ growth performance.  
  Table 2 reports two measures of the contribution of capital stock growth to to-
tal GNP growth and uses them to derive estimates of the growth of TFP. The first, 
TFP 1, is calculated from a Cobb-Douglas production function under standard as-
sumptions: the elasticity of output with respect to capital is set to one third, capital’s 
share in national income.
11 Under neoclassical convergence, the gap between actual 
and steady state output is explained by the gap between actual and steady-state capi-
tal/labor ratios. Along the convergence path the growth rate of labor productivity 
(Y/L) equals the growth rate of the capital/labor ratio (K/L) times the contribution of 
capital to output.
12 Under these assumptions, K/L should return to its steady state 
three times as fast as Y/L. This, clearly, was not the case in 1950s Germany: capital 
grew more slowly than output, not three times faster. Evidently, other factors resulting 
                                                 
11  In the neoclassical model with perfect competition and no externalities, the elasticity of 
output with respect to capital and capital’s share in national income can be shown to be 
equal. 
12  Assuming that TFP growth is unchanged (see e.g. Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1995). We re-
turn momentarily to the assumption of an unchanged TFP growth rate.   8
in further increases in the rate of TFP growth must have also contributed to the 
Wirtschaftswunder.
13  
  We construct an alternative measure, TFP 2, by doubling the elasticity of out-
put with respect to capital from to 0.66 (as in Mankiw, Romer and Weil 1992). This 
can be thought of as capturing the external effects of capital-stock growth suggested 
by new growth theories. Although this second variant assigns a larger role to invest-
ment, it is still the case that K/L should be growing faster than Y/L, which is counter-
factual. More than half the economy’s growth in the 1950s remains to be explained. 
 The  conclusion  is  reinforced by the comparison of Germany and Britain. The 
difference in aggregate growth rates between the two countries is larger than the dif-
ference in their capital stock growth rates. Even extreme versions of new growth the-
ory, such as Romer (1987), which assume strong positive externalities from capital 
accumulation, do not posit an elasticity of output with respect to capital of greater 
than one. As a matter of arithmetic, then, differences in the rate of capital accumula-
tion between Germany and Britain can only explain part of observed differences in 
their growth performance.  
So why, then, did TFP grew so fast in postwar Germany and so much faster 
than in Britain? One possibility is that TFP levels had received a sharp negative shock 
from which it bounced back subsequently. This relatively straightforward explanation 
for Germany’s rapid growth has not received much attention in this literature.  To ex-
plain why, we show that previous investigators have tended to underestimate the 
magnitude of this shock by comparing 1938 with 1948. In 1938 the German economy 
was still significantly below its steady-state growth path as a result of sharp negative 
                                                 
13 Under present assumptions, as much as three quarters of output growth remains to be ex-
plained.   9
shocks during World War I, the turbulent post-WWI period, and the slump of the 
early 1930s. The economy then expanded strongly through 1944, bringing it closer to 
its historical steady-state growth path.  
This may seem surprising given wartime Allied efforts to destroy the produc-
tive capacity of the German economy. Yet, as Table 3 shows, the capital stock in 
German in fact manufacturing grew substantially during the war. The available esti-
mates put West German industrial capacity around mid-1944 at more than one third 
above 1936 levels.
14 In 1948, surviving industrial capacity was 13 percent higher than 
in 1936.
15 Data for aggregate capital stock in 1950 suggest a slight decline below 
prewar levels, caused mainly by the destruction of urban housing. The data look even 
better for equipment and suggest that, at the beginning of the Wirtschaftswunder, pro-
ductive capacity in West Germany was as high as before the war. In comparison to 
Britain’s capital stock, Germany’s position around 1950 looked worse, but not dra-
matically so. Certainly, differences in capital stock growth and surviving capital en-
dowment cannot account for the dramatically different growth performance in the 
1950s. 
And if the war did surprisingly little to reduce the capital stock, it actually in-
creased West Germany’s population and labor force. Returning soldiers and refugees 
from the provinces lost to Poland and Russia, as well as from Eastern Europe, swelled 
                                                 
14  While the capital stock grew strongly, labor input in the German war economy actually 
fell. Table 4 provides rough estimates for the civilian population in 1944, including forced 
laborers. The German war economy relied massively on slave labor: the available esti-
mates rise to 8.5 million for mid-1944, of whom about 3.8 million may have been in West 
Germany. At the same time, the cumulative figure for military recruiting stood at 18 mil-
lion, of which 8.4 million were from West Germany. As female labor force participation 
was discouraged, (voluntary) female employment declined by about 10 percent during the 
war. 
15  In East Germany, the decline from the 1944 peak was stronger due to intense dismantling 
by the Soviets. However, even here the total decline just undid the wartime additions to the 
capital stock.   10
the population by almost 20 percent over the 1939 census. At the same time, more 
than eight million surviving slave laborers were repatriated or emigrated. Overall, 
West Germany’s population increased by 9 percent from 1946 to 1950.  
In Britain, unlike Germany, the capital stock increased only little during the 
war. The available estimates put the cumulative increase between 1936 and 1944 at 5 
percent (Table 3). But wartime damage was even more limited. Thus, in 1946, Brit-
ain’s aggregate capital stock was probably 7 percent higher than a decade earlier. On 
balance, this is very similar to West Germany (Table 3), aggregate data for which 
show a net increase from 1936 to 1950 by 7 percent as well. In the immediate postwar 
years, the civilian labor force rose considerably as soldiers were demobilized. Com-
parative evidence thus shows that the net changes in factor endowments in the two 
countries were not very different.  
Yet the behavior of output was very different. Britain suffered a substantial 
postwar recession, with the fall in output per worker averaging 7 percent per annum in 
the first two postwar years. But if Britain’s postwar shock was severe, Germany’s was 
a catastrophe. Table 5 shows output, capital, and labor on constant postwar territory. 
From 1944 to 1946, output in what became West Germany fell at an annualized rate 
of 38 percent. Most if not all of this decline occurred between mid-1944 and mid-
1945, implying that output fell by two thirds in that year.  
The decline was more pronounced still in per capita terms. Table 4 suggests a 
rise in West German population by 20 percent between 1944 and 1946.
16 Dividing the 
                                                 
16  In Table 5 we have attempted to exclude former slave laborers waiting to be repatriated 
from the population data for 1946. A population census in 1946 attempted to do just that 
but has been criticized for lacking reliability. However, most of these problems concern 
the Soviet occupation zone, whose data do not enter in Table 5. For a discussion, see 
Karlsch (1993).   11
decline of output by the population increase, we arrive at an annualized rate of decline 
of per capita output of almost 50 percent between 1944 and 1946.  
The fall in the capital/labor ratio of nearly 20 percent a year, or a cumulative 
31 percent, was again an order of magnitude higher than the decline in Britain’s capi-
tal/labor ratio. But comparing this with the decline in German per capita output of 47 
percent per year—in other words, 7 times the British rate—it is clear that most of the 
loss in German output came from reduced efficiency in production rather than from a 
lower capital/labor ratio. On an annualized basis, West German TFP declined by al-
most 40 percent, which is two times as much as the decline in the capital/labor ratio. 
On a smaller scale, the same conclusion holds for Britain. Between 1944 and 
1946, TFP fell by 5-6 percent per year, which is again more than two times the fall of 
the capital/labor ratio in the same period.
17 Cumulatively, the data in Table 5 suggest 
a decline in German TFP of 69 percent between 1944 and 1946, as opposed to a cu-
mulative decline in British TFP of 12 percent.  
  The sources of this contrast are not hard to find. Beginning in mid-1944, Al-
lied bombing changed its tactics to maximize damage to bottleneck sectors of the 
German economy (see Birkenfeld, 1964, Budraß, 1998). Bombing now targeted elec-
tric power, synthetic fuels generation, and the railroad network. Rather than destroy-
ing productive capacity, it simply disrupted the supply chain – most prominently sup-
plies of coal, which were now much harder to get from the pithead to the power sta-
tion and factory. Resulting shortages of raw materials and the consequent energy cri-
sis persisted into 1947, limiting postwar production.
18 This was especially true of 
                                                 
17  Even faster than in the slump of the early 1930s. 
18  In 1946-7 coal was shipped across the Atlantic to make up for the supplies that were not 
forthcoming from the Ruhr, but these shipments made up only part of the shortfall.   12
West Germany, where coal production in 1947 was still only 52 percent of 1938 lev-
els. In Britain, coal output in the same year reached 87 percent (see Table 3).  
Both economies then rebounded from these shocks. In the immediate postwar 
years, British output growth outstripped the growth of capital and labor inputs, allow-
ing TFP to rise by almost 2 percent a year. As Table 5 shows, the years 1948-1950 
saw even more rapid recovery of German output. Reflecting inflows of refugees and 
returning prisoners of war, the labor force grew as well, together with the capital stock 
after 1948. But output grew faster, and very considerably so. As a result, between 
1946 and 1950 TFP growth surged ahead at 15 to 20 percent per annum. These are big 
numbers compared to those associated with the capital deepening and structural 
change described above. The main factor explaining Germany’s rapid growth in 1948-
50, in other words, was the negative shock to TFP in 1944-46 and the scope that now 
existed for reversing it.  
The bottom panel of Table 5 suggests that there was still considerable scope 
for this process to continue after 1950. While British labor productivity and TFP had 
recovered to within 5 percent of 1944 levels by 1950, West German output per capita 
and TFP were still 30 to 40 percent below their 1941 levels. 
We can gain further perspective on how much scope existed for rapid growth 
by reversing the immediate postwar shock and returning the German economy to its 
long-term growth path by looking more closely at that long-term growth path itself. 
Had the forces driving growth in Germany and Britain before World War I prevailed 
throughout the 20th century, the trend growth of output could simply be extrapolated 
from their respective paths prior to 1914. Figure 1 shows gross domestic product per 
capita for Britain and Germany/West Germany, along with their extrapolated trend   13
lines from 1900–1913.
19 As can be seen, German GDP per capita hovered below his-
torical trend throughout the interwar years and came close only during the war boom 
of the early 1940s. Following the catastrophic decline in German GDP at the end of 
the war, output per capita returned to the path established in the early 20th century. 
Like the preceding analysis, this suggests that the 1950s was essentially a period of 
recovery from a highly irregular starting point.  
Not all of the productivity gains during World War II were sustainable. While 
the increase in German labor productivity between 1941 and 1944 was a cumulative 
13 percent, much of this reflected the involuntary extension of hours and the exploita-
tion of slave labor. Britain’s productivity record provides a counterfactual: while Brit-
ish productivity also increased between 1941 and 1943, it fell in 1944 despite intense 
efforts to keep going at the previous speed. The implication is that the productivity 
gain in the German war economy between 1941 and 1944 was not sustainable in 
peacetime. Consequently, the productivity gap between the 1941 level and the ex-
trapolated trend in Figure 1 indicates potential for catching up that cannot be ex-
plained by the adverse TFP shock at the end of the war. That said, Figure 1 shows 
clearly that growth performance in the 1950s was driven not by the remaining dis-
tance from the historical steady state in 1941 but rather by the sharp dislocation from 
that position around 1945—in other words, not by neoclassical convergence but by 
recovery from the wartime shock to TFP.  
                                                 
 
19 Note that these expansion paths are plotted on a semi-logarithmic scale. We chose 1900–
1913 as the base period instead of starting even earlier because of the limitations of the 
German data, whose quality is inferior before 1900, but also because the turn of the cen-
tury marked a shift in away from extensive growth (accompanied by falling fertility and 
emigration rates) and therefore a significant structural break. A related exercise with data 
extending back to 1870 was first made by Borchardt (1977 [1991]).   14
  The converse is true of Britain. Britain’s 1900–1913 trend is flatter than Ger-
many’s, and from the mid-1930s the extrapolated German trend line is always above 
the British line.
20 To be sure, previous authors have argued for a break in the British 
data around the time of the post-World War I depression (see Crafts and Mills 1996). 
After 1921, the British economy seems to have grown around a new trend path which 
is steeper than the historical one. This new trend is almost identical to the extrapolated 
German trend line of 1900–1913. But, importantly, Britain’s growth trajectory seems 
only mildly affected by World War II—unlike Germany’s. Germany’s exceptional 
position in the 1950s and the subsequent return to trend are reflected in Table 2 as 
well. Already in the 1960s, Germany TFP growth (measured as TFP 1) was back at 
the low British levels of two percent per year and less.
21 In contrast, British TFP 
growth did not change much from the 1950s to the 1960s, again suggesting that Brit-
ain was already close to its steady state. 
  Thus, the acceleration in TFP growth that sets Germany apart in the 1950s 
should be understood as a reversal of the temporary collapse of TFP in the wake of 
World War II. Recovery from this collapse largely accounts for the subsequent accel-
eration in the 1950s. Capital accumulation and the associated process of neoclassical 
convergence can explain only a small fraction of the observed fluctuations even under 
the most favorable assumptions.  
                                                 
20 To establish the robustness of these results, we experimented with data from Maddison 
(1995) and Hoffmann and Müller (1959), extending the trend back to 1870. Although these 
backward extensions do affect the position of the German trend line, there is consistent 
evidence of German per-capita output growth having been about 40–50% higher than that 
of Britain in the last third of the 19th century. We also experimented with extending the 
British trend backwards and found it to be highly stable.  
21  Note that our estimate of German TFP growth, derived from the standard data set of Mad-
dison (1991), is below companion estimates for the 1960s, probably because we use hours, 
not persons, and standardized, not raw capital stock data here. Inspection of the data re-
veals that Germany experienced another investment boom during that decade. But unlike 
in the 1950s, this investment boom failed to produce similarly high growth.   15
  
3. Structural Change 
 One  possible  explanation for the TFP surge in Germany in the 1950s is struc-
tual change. Throughout the 1950s, labor moved out of unproductive sectors like 
peasant farming. The conventional growth accounting measures discussed in the pre-
vious section would then underestimate the growth of labor in the productive sectors, 
and accordingly overstate TFP growth. As emphasized by Temin, and as Table 1 
bears out, the inherited imbalance between agricultural labor and agricultural output 
shares was larger in Germany than in Britain. Britain had seen the agricultural share 
of employment fall to low levels as a result of its early the abolition of agricultural 
protection, while Germany had maintained a tradition of agricultural protectionism 
since Bismarck’s tariff of 1879. 20
th century Germany thus inherited a large agricul-
tural sector dominated by small, unproductive family farms in the west and south and 
overstaffed, inefficient Junker estates in the east, which together still employed a 
quarter of the labor force in 1939. Agriculture then absorbed much of the influx of 
refugees into West Germany after 1945, such that the sector accounted for over 20 
percent of total employment in the census year 1950.  
  By how much could structural change involving the reallocation of labor from 
agriculture to industry have raised growth? Answering this question requires extend-
ing the neoclassical model, inevitably making it more complex.
22 But since we wish 
to argue that structural change cannot explain the very sharp acceleration in German 
economic growth in the 1950s, we can impose any simplifying assumption that biases 
our conclusions in favor of the structural change hypothesis. Imagine for example that 
the marginal product of labor in agriculture was zero. This biases our findings in favor 
                                                 
22  Previous attempts to do this include Sicsic and Wyplosz (1996), Barro (1999) and Temple 
(2001).   16
of the hypothesis that output and productivity were raised by shifting labor from agri-
culture to industry, since under this extreme assumption reallocating labor results in 
no fall in agricultural output. With agricultural output unchanged, we can ignore the 
contribution of that sector. We have: 
 
  Y = (BL)
(1-a)K
a                                                                                                                                    (1)
  
 
where Y is output, K is capital (which is employed in the industrial sector), L is labor, 
and B is the share of the labor force employed in the industrial sector. Log differenti-
ating: 
 
  dY/Y = (1-a)(dB/B) + (1-a)(dL/L) + a(dK/K)                                               (2)  
or 
 
  dY/Y – dL/L = a[(dK/K – dL/L] + (1-a)[dB/B]                                             (3)  
 
The rate of growth of output per worker is no longer just the rate of growth of the 
capital/ratio multiplied by the elasticity of output with respect to capital (the term ap-
pearing immediately to the right of the equality in equation 3). Now this expression is 
augmented by the rate of change in the share of the labor force in industry times one 
minus that same elasticity (labor’s share of output in the Cobb-Douglas case), which 
captures the additional effect of structural change on output growth. 
  Between 1950 and 1960 the share of the labor force outside of agriculture rose 
at an annual rate of 1.1 percent.
23 Even assuming a relatively high elasticity of output 
with respect to labor such as 0.66, as in the TFP 2 variant in Section 2 above, this can 
account only for an additional (0.66)*1.1 or 0.73 percentage points of annual GDP 
                                                 
23  From 77.8 percent in 1950 to 86.7 percent in 1960. (Authors’ calculations from Table 1.)   17
growth, which is only a small part of the observed acceleration in growth, which aver-
aged close to 8 percent. Under the more standard assumptions of an elasticity of 0.33, 
the point is reinforced. Thus, while the move out of agriculture was clearly there, it 
hardly accounts for the fast growth of the West German economy in the 1950s.
24 
  This appears to be a general pattern. Building on earlier work of Dumke 
(1990), Temin (2002) presented econometric evidence to evaluate the various expla-
nations for postwar growth in Europe, and came out in favor of declining agriculture. 
In his cross-country convergence regressions, the agricultural employment share in 
1950 showed up with large and significant coefficients, and dominated rival explana-
tions. Germany appeared to be just a case in point, not an exception to the rule.  
  The Dumke/Temin regressions have the form: 
 
  dY/Y = a + b(Y*-Y) + c(GAP) + f(A*-A)                                                 (4) 
 
where Y is output per capita and Y* is its corresponding steady state, GAP is the 
change in output between 1938 and 1948 as a measure of the wartime and postwar 
shocks, and A is the share of employment in agriculture, with A* its corresponding 
steady state level. a, b, c, and f are parameters to be estimated.
25 Assuming that Y* 
and A* are the same across European countries, they can be collected with the con-
stant term, giving: 
 
  dY/Y = (a+bY*+fA*) –b(Y) + c(GAP) – f(A) (5)  
 
                                                 
24  Using a more complex model, Temple (2001, p.17) reaches similar results, that “the labour 
reallocation effect generally accounts for between a twentieth and a seventh of annual 
growth in output per worker.” For the period 1950-55 his point estimate is 0.82 percent of 
output per worker per annum, almost exactly what we find under the TFP 2 variant. For 
1955-60 his point estimate is 0.58, midway between our TFP 1 and TFP 2 variants.  
25  Here we follow Temin, whose specification is more general.   18
Here b measures the speed of neoclassical convergence, c the impact of recovery from 
the wartime shock, and f the importance of arrested development giving way to struc-
tural change. Temin estimates this equation for 15 Western European countries. He 
shows that the share of employment in agriculture (A) is often significant. In contrast, 
the GAP variable designed to capture the importance of wartime and postwar shocks 
is not significant at conventional confidence levels in any of his equations. On its face 
this would seem to be evidence against our interpretation.  
  We were able to partly replicate the results in Temin (2002) (Table 6, left 
panel). For the same specification and data, we find that the 1950s the coefficients on 
both GAP and A differ significantly from zero, A at the 95 percent level, GAP at the 
99  percent confidence level. Temin, in contrast, reports an insignificant coefficient on 
GAP for the 1950s; this was one result that we were not able to replicate. But, not-
withstanding the good fit of the equation, Germany is still an outlier. Adding a 
dummy variable for Germany to the equation for the 1950s yields a coefficient of 
1.08,
26 (and then does render the GAP coefficient insignificant). In other words, these 
variables provide only a partial explanation for German growth in the 1950s. 
As we argued previously, the 1938/48 output gap may underestimate the dis-
ruptive effect of World War II on European growth. A better comparison is with 
1944, which marks the height of the war economy in Germany. However, it could be 
argued that this is not an appropriate basis for gauging postwar productivity capacity, 
since 1944 levels were artificially boosted by longer hours of work and by contribu-
tions from slave laborers and prisoners of war that did not continue after that year. As 
                                                 
26 That is, Germany grew by an additional 1.08  percent per annum over and above what can 
be explained by the three independent variables and average European experience. The co-
efficient in question differs from zero at the 90 percent confidence level.   19
a compromise, we choose 1941 as a benchmark, when Germany was more or less 
back on its long-term growth path and in a position more analogous to Britain.  
When we measure the wartime disruption with the 1941/1946 gap, the fit of 
the regression improves, and the coefficient on the output gap becomes larger.
27 
Moreover, Germany becomes less of an outlier: unexplained German growth is now 
down to approximately 0.6 percentage points per year, and the dummy variable for 
Germany no longer differs from zero at conventional confidence levels. 
In addition, the dominant role of GAP compared to A during the Golden Age 
is confirmed if we measure growth not by the log difference in GDP, as in Temin 
(2002), but by the geometric growth rate (Table 6, right hand panel).
28 Log differ-
ences accurately approximate growth rates only for small values. The faster the 
growth rate, the larger the margin by which it is understated by this approximation. 
Measuring our data in growth rates, the coefficient on the dummy variable for Ger-
many is reduced further, to below 0.3, and it is not different from zero. The regres-
sions in growth rates thus capture the German case better and again confirm the im-
portance of the drop in output across the end of World War II. 
Support for our view that structural change and the postwar shock both matter 
is that both coefficients are also significant when we run the regression again for the 
1960s and 1970s. As one would expect, the coefficients on both variables decline over 
time, signaling a weakening influence of the postwar’s starting conditions on growth 
performance. Pooling the data for the three periods (the 1950s, 1960s, and the 1970-
                                                 
27  Inserting the 1944/1946 gap, which underlies also the calculations in Table 5 above, would 
have yielded even better results. Working instead with the 1941/46 gap thus biases the re-
sults in Table 6 against our working hypotheses of high GAP effects on the German econ-
omy.  
28  In the RHS panel of Table 6, we also measure the independent variables in logs, as is 
common in the literature on convergence regressions. Doing so improved the fit further 
and reduced the size of the dummy variable for Germany.   20
89 period) and running one regression on all 45 observations again delivers significant 
coefficients on both variables.
29 We also regressed the difference in average growth 
rates after 1970 and during the 1960s. Results again point to a strong role for the GAP 
variable: the stronger a country’s wartime shock, the faster its growth slowdown since 
the 1970s. By comparison, agriculture appears to play a lesser role in explaining the 
slowdown, and remains insignificant.  
 This  comparative  evidence suggests that both Janossy (1969) and Temin 
(2002) were right on the causes of Europe’s postwar growth. Wartime disruptions 
caused output to be displaced from potential, creating scope for fast recovery as the 
economies of Europe moved back toward trend; this is the reconstruction hypothesis 
specified by Janossy (1969) and tested by Dumke (1990). At the same time, the scope 
for growth was greater where agriculture predominated, the delayed modernization of 
agriculture having depressed output and productivity in many countries of continental 
Europe. The result of sectoral shift from low-productivity farming to high-
productivity industries was now faster aggregate growth of output and productivity; 
this is the agricultural labor share hypothesis spelled out by Temin (2002). But the 
wartime and postwar shock emphasized by Janossy and Dumke is quantitatively more 
important, and certainly so in postwar Germany. 
 
4. Institutional Change: The Image 
 Olson’s  (1982)  institutional-change hypothesis posits a sharp shift in German 
institutions after World War II and an equally sharp break in the growth process. It 
claims that the shake-up of traditional structures caused by the Nazis and Ordo-
                                                 
29  All of the results reported in Table 6 go through in a panel regression. We retained a speci-
fication closer to Temin’s (2002) and Dumke’s (1990) regressions to facilitate comparison. 
Results for the panel regressions are available on request.   21
liberalism destabilized traditional rent-seeking coalitions, unleashing a 
Wirtschaftswunder that continued until new coalitions formed and sclerosis again set 
in. Adherents to this view cite the break-up of industrial conglomerates, the weaken-
ing of business associations, the currency reform, the elimination of price controls, 
and the creation of an intensively competitive market environment as leaving little 
scope for lobbying by special interests. In this view, West Germany’s Social Market 
Economy was a new economic system free of both the social divisions of Weimar and 
the excessive state intervention of the Nazis.
30 This explains both why growth was 
faster in the 1950s than the 1920s and why the performance of the German economy 
surpassed that of other economies like Britain’s where a comparable institutional 
shakeup was absent. 
  In this section we argue that this view is more image than reality. West Ger-
many’s postwar political establishment was eager to depict postwar economic reform 
as a radical departure from the state socialism of the Third Reich, and this image was 
taken up by contemporary scholars.  But subsequent scholarship has shown that actual 
reforms were in fact quite limited.
31 Differences in the institutional constellation and 
the policies that flowed from it differed surprisingly little between Weimar and post-
                                                 
30 Coined by ordo-liberal economist Alfred Müller-Armack in 1947, the term was originally 
supposed to hint to the welfare efficiency of the market process itself. Soon, however, it 
came to denote the specific West German synthesis between regulated capitalism and the 
Bismarckian welfare state. A collection of seminal essays of Germany’s ordo-liberals on 
the Social Market Economy is Koslowski (1998). Its architect, Ludwig Erhard, became a 
figure of mythical fame, as did the Bundesbank as the guardian of the deutschmark. Em-
blematic of this is a book by Erhard (1960) entitled Wohlstand für alle (or Prosperity for 
Everyone) Aimed to capitalize on Erhard’s reputation as the architect of Germany’s eco-
nomic recovery, it shows a visibly overweight Erhard with his typical big cigar. Both the 
weight gain and the tobacco product conveyed the message that not just Erhard but every-
one had made it. 
31   Abelshauser (1985) emphasized these facts. In a highly critical biography, Hentschel 
(1986) pictured Erhard’s policies as mostly failed. The biographies by Laitenberger (1986) 
and recently, Mierzejewski (2004) present more balanced accounts of Erhard’s successes 
and failures.    22
World War II Germany and, for that matter, between Germany and Britain. It is thus 
hard to point to those institutions and policies as the explanation for differences in 
growth and productivity performance. 
  A delicate issue in this context is that Weimar’s regulatory framework had 
been extended by the Third Reich. Under the aegis of Hjalmar Schacht, industry and 
professional organizations were given legal power to regulate entry, to set prices and 
conditions of contract, and to enter into binding collective agreements. Reforms af-
fected most major sectors from banking and insurance to energy, transport, the free 
professions and the traditional crafts (which were basically exempted from competi-
tion). As a result, large parts of the German economy were tightly regulated even be-
fore the inauguration of wartime planning. Reforms included mandatory collective 
bargaining in the health sector, the extension of the vocational training system from 
the traditional crafts to manufacturing, banking and the service sector, the tight regu-
lation of pharmacies, and even the mandatory presence of midwives at childbirth, a 
profession that was itself newly regulated through vocational training (see Barkai, 
1990). Much of this legislation was a reaction to the Great Depression. It reflected a 
corporatist zeitgeist among Weimar’s ministerial bureaucracy, which continued to be 
influential through the mid-1930s. Far from having a coherent view on economic pol-
icy, the Nazis were initially glad to accept the proposals presented by these experts so 
long as they did not conflict with their power political goals. These regulations from 
the first years of Nazi rule, as well as the institutions they created, all existed in 1945 
and could be reactivated once wartime rationing was lifted. 
  Yet we are not claiming entirely seamless continuity. After 1936, Schacht’s 
influence waned, and a second, more ideological wave of economic policy began to 
develop. Large economic planning boards were created during the Four Year Plan of   23
1937-40, as well as the Hermann Goering Werke, a state-run steel trust that soon be-
came the world’s largest industrial conglomerate. A as the regime pressed for acceler-
ated war preparation, more and more stringent wartime controls were superimposed 
on the existing regulatory framework But the centralization of economic planning 
provoked sharp criticism and, eventually, a reaction.  The turnaround came in 1941, 
when Goering and the bureaucracies under his control lost influence. As a conse-
quence, the German war economy was reprivatized. The large state agencies associ-
ated with Goering’s industrial empire were partly reorganized and partly dismantled. 
Responsibility for economic war planning was divided between a new armament min-
istry and the umbrella organizations of German business created in the early years of 
the Third Reich. Prominent economists lobbied for relying more heavily on the mar-
ket mechanism for guiding the allocation of resources. Not without success: in 1943, 
the Commerce Ministry established a task force to plan for postwar economic and 
currency reform. Upon the recommendation of and with financial support from the 
top industry association, a lobbyist was found who was willing to take the job—no 
small risk, as it violated orders against any sort of postwar planning. The successful 
candidate was a certain Ludwig Erhard. 
  Since the work of Herbst (1982) that explores these interconnections between 
the pro-market economists within the perimeters of power and those outside, a con-
sensus on the continuity of economic policy doctrine between the Third Reich and 
early postwar Germany has emerged.
32 Erhard’s 1948 reforms are not a radical depar-
                                                 
32  Opposition to central planning came from circles both within and outside the party. From 
within, microeconomist von Stackelberg tried to build a network of pro-market experts, 
and to lobby the Berlin ministries (Anderson 1987). From outside, economists around von 
Beckerath (formerly Stackelberg’s thesis adviser at Cologne) and Eucken voiced their con-
cerns and kept in close contact with political resistance circles. Despite strict censorship, 
Eucken (1940) published a book on economic systems, arguing that all forms of central 
planning inevitably led to socialism. This book later became formative for a generation of   24
ture from a socialist past but rather as putting into practice a program that had devel-
oped since the early 1940s. 
 
5.  Institutional Change: The Reality 
  If institutional shake-up had been widespread, the result would have been far-
reaching changes in German policy and sharp differences from policy in other coun-
tries where institutional sclerosis was more pronounced. In this section we show that 
this was not the case. 
  Competition policy.  The British occupation authorities had relied on a revita-
lized version of existing entrepreneurs’ associations for economic planning. American 
pressure and allied anti-cartel legislation gradually reduced their power again, al-
though occupation authorities admitted that reconstruction without the expertise of 
these associations was impossible, and there were suspicions that the old cartels con-
tinued to operate in a more covert form into the 1950s (Plumpe 1987). Grunenberg 
(2006) highlights the continuity of business career networks across the war. The same 
people who organized the war economy in the early 1940s were at the helm of Ger-
man big business and its associations in the 1950s, except for a few of the most com-
promised collaborators with the Nazi regime. 
  The U.S. occupation authorities had also sought to deconcentrate big business. 
In some cases this was successful, as with IG Farben. The company was divided into 
four enterprises, creating a market structure that survived to the 1990s. One explana-
tion for this stability is precisely that stable oligopolistic structures had always charac-
                                                                                                                                            
German postwar economists. Opposition to central planning enjoyed some degree of pro-
tection by a leading SS figure, Otto Ohlendorf, who headed SD Inland, the domestic Ge-
stapo branch, since 1939, and who had led an Einsatzgruppe in 1941/2. An economist of 
ardent pro-market convictions, he became undersecretary in the commerce ministry in 
1943, and was also involved in organizing Erhard’s work, see Herbst (1982).   25
terized the chemical industry. In the cases of heavy industry and banking, deconcen-
tration was less lasting (Mollin 1988, Wixforth 1995). An additional problem was in-
terdependencies within German heavy industry, which relied on the joint production 
of coal, steel, gas and electricity. This made it difficult to deconcentrate without re-
placing cartel agreements by an equally complicated regulatory framework. The solu-
tion found in the Schuman Plan of 1950 was to put the industries of the Ruhr under 
the control of a European-wide regulatory board. However, this did not prevent 
reconcentration of West German heavy industry (Abelshauser 1984, Gillingham 
1991).  
  The most obvious defeat of American-inspired competition policies was in 
banking. US regulators had attempted to create a state banking system for postwar 
Germany. The big Berlin banks were split up and successor institutions were created 
on a zonal basis. The German government was pressed to cast the new situation into 
federal law. However, after West Germany regained its sovereignty in 1955, these 
laws were lifted, and the zonal banks merged. Even during the years of decon-
centration, the regional successor banks of the old Deutsche Bank continued to oper-
ate a joint shadow executive board that coordinated their strategies, approved large 
credits, and distributed revenues (Holtfrerich 1995).
33 
  Under American aegis, the economic administration under Erhard and later the 
federal government attempted to adopt tight anti-cartel legislation, but a proposal 
drafted by Ordo-liberals failed in 1951. Resistance from heavy industry delayed the 
                                                 
33 The influence of large banks on German big business and the possible inofficial cartel 
structures created by this has continued to attract scholarly attention (e.g. Edwards and 
Fischer 1994), although historical research seems to imply that the influence of banks and 
financial conglomerates on German industry may in fact have been quite limited (see 
Wellhoener, 1989, for the imperial period, Wixforth, 1995, for the Weimar Republic, and 
James, 1995, James, 2001, and Feldman, 2001, for the Nazi years).   26
passage of an antitrust law until 1957, when finally a bill was adopted (Berghahn 
1986).  
  The new law did significantly widen the scope of anti-cartel policy. Since 
1897, cartels had been fully enforceable in court. Legislation in 1933 allowed for car-
tels to be banned if they were against the public interest, and the aforementioned wave 
of regulations in large sectors of the economy substituted for the old cartel arrange-
ments. Now, most cartels were made illegal, but with exceptions precisely in the areas 
that had been regulated after the Great Depression. For the most part, the legislation 
adopted to fill the gaps was a carbon copy of law from the 1930s. As a result, large 
swaths of the German economy continued to be tightly regulated under rules set in the 
1930s. Mandatory vocational training, collective bargaining in the health sector, as 
well as the midwife monopoly and the restrictions on pharmacies still exist in Ger-
many today, as do many other such regulations. Deregulation of banking, insurance, 
transport and energy only began in the 1990s, mostly through European legislation 
and usually against bitter German resistance. 
  Thus, Erhard’s struggle to push a market-friendly agenda for competition pol-
icy was uphill. Based on a consensus that formed in the early 1950s, earlier regula-
tions limiting competition were reintroduced with only minor modifications. In con-
trast to the Eastern European transformation countries after 1989, Germany had inher-
ited a fully functional, albeit highly regulatory framework of economic institutions 
from the 1930s. Rather than embarking on radical reform, German policymakers in 
the 1950s preferred the constitution inherited from the past. Only such minor changes 
were adopted as were needed to avoid a rupture with the Allies. An Olsonian struc-
tural break in German competition policy after World War II is nowhere in sight.   27
  All this was not dissimilar from the situation in Britain. Collusive arrange-
ments were a British tradition: during the 1930s and the war some 60 percent of Brit-
ish manufacturing was covered by such agreements. They were used in the 1930s to 
shelter weak firms from the slump, and during the war to smooth the flow of inputs to 
the military. Officials saw cartels as convenient for pursuing their industrial agendas; 
it was easier to meet with a few industrial leaders than to organize a large number of 
small entrepreneurs. Yet another motive for disregarding the potential for abuses by 
industrial rings was to exploit economies of scale and scope. America’s example sug-
gested that units of production had to be enlarged to compete, and cooperation and 
consolidation were viewed as means to this end.  
  Legal restraints did little to inhibit collusion, Britain possessing no analog to 
the U.S. Sherman Anti-Trust Act. Not until 1956 with the adoption of the Restrictive 
Practices Act was a serious effort made to discourage collusive practices. Even then, 
mergers were rarely discouraged as restraints to trade, and the Conservative Govern-
ment extended legal sanction to price maintenance schemes. The impact on competi-
tion was debilitating.
34 
 Postwar  Labour  Governments, hostile to high prices and profits, acknowl-
edged the costs of price maintenance schemes. Their solution was not to break up col-
lusive arrangements or regulate natural monopolies, however, but to bring the offend-
ing industries under government ownership and control.
35 Nationalization proceeded 
                                                 
34 As one contemporary observed, the restrictive practices of trade associations were “the 
greatest single cause of the lack of all dynamism in British industry.” Cited in Harris 
(1972), p.222.One attempt to measure this effect is in Crafts (1995): he includes in a cross-
section model of the determinants of the determinants of productivity growth in the period 
1954-63 (using data for 57 British industries) the change in the five-firm concentration ra-
tio (as a measure of the scope for collusion), finding a negative coefficient on the margin 
of significance at the 10 percent confidence level. 
35 The commitment to nationalization had been given official status in Clause IV of the 
party’s 1918 constitution drafted by Sidney Webb.   28
from the Bank of England, the coal industry and BOAC in 1946 to the railways, wa-
terways and electricity in 1947, gas in 1948, and iron and steel in 1949. By 1951 more 
than two million workers were employed in public corporations.  
  The productivity and profitability of these public companies was hardly admi-
rable. Between 1948 and 1958, labor productivity in nationalized industry grew by 
only 1.5 percent per year, a percentage point below the average for the British econo-
my as a whole. With unionists on both sides of the bargaining table, public corpora-
tions provided generous wage settlements. Soft budget constraints gave management 
little incentive to minimize costs. Pressured to help with political problems like the 
existence of depressed regions, managers had mixed motives when allocating re-
sources. 
  Thus, there is a striking degree of parallelism in competition policy in Britain 
and in West Germany. Neither country possessed an antitrust culture resembling the 
Sherman Act. In Britain, nationalization, not competition, was the order of the day. In 
Germany, Allied decartelization had limited impact on corporate culture. Although 
there was much talk of privatization and competition, little happened outside the 
chemical industry. Privatization of the huge state-owned conglomerates in iron and 
steel, machinery or auto industry hardly got off the ground until the 1970s, nor did 
competition policy. In both countries antitrust laws passed in the 1950s left large 
loopholes that insulated the respective national economies from competition, a condi-
tion that changed only in the 1980s in Britain and the 1990s in Germany.  
  Labor markets. Similar continuity is event in the structure of labor markets.  
The occupation authorities quickly resurrected Weimar’s trade unions, even rehabili-
tating many of the same individuals who had occupied high positions prior to Na-
tional Socialism. They encouraged the resumption of industry-level bargaining for the   29
convenience of having recognized labor spokesmen with whom to deal. Unions were 
organized along the same lines as in the 1920s (with some 16 industrial unions, each 
with a corresponding employers’ association) and participated in the same kind of na-
tional congress. As in the 1920, unions were dedicated to democratic socialism and in 
some cases openly hostile to markets. They demonstrated their renewed strength in 
1948, soon after the currency reform, when a sharp increase in the price level led to 
real wages losses and provoked a wave of strikes (Buchheim 1990). The subsequent 
rise in unemployment fueled resistance to Erhard’s supply-side policies. The govern-
ment felt the pressure so strongly that it contemplated a Keynesian job creation pro-
gram, which was rejected only when recovery gained sufficient momentum to pacify 
union demands (Berger and Ritschl 1995, Berger 1997).
36  
  For iron and coal, the Codetermination Act of 1951 placed workers’ represen-
tatives on company boards, allowing them to surveil their employers and verify that 
the latter were keeping their investment commitments. The Works Constitution Act of 
1952, based on similar Allied acts of the late 1940s and on slightly less comprehen-
sive legislation from the Weimar Republic, had similar effects; moreover, it secured 
monopoly for the trade union in representing firm workers. 
  Given that German mining and heavy industry enjoyed the most elaborate sys-
tem of industrial relations, it was there that the success of trading wages for high in-
vestment should have been most evident. But in fact, investment rates in this sector 
were so low that an energy crisis developed in 1950. The Investment Aid Act of 1951 
imposed a levy on wide segments of German industry in order to pour into coal, steel, 
                                                 
36 A similar point could be made for agriculture whose lobby remained intact and powerful 
despite the disappearance of the “Junker” class of the politically influential landed nobility. 
Here as much as in iron and steel, German regulations, often inherited from Nazi economic 
planning, were successively replaced by EEC-wide market control that attempted to regu-
late the market with very similar instruments (on this, see Kluge, 1988).   30
electricity generation and transport funds that owners, capital markets, and banks 
could not or would not supply.
37 In 1950 when this crisis was mounting, the miners’ 
union managed to obtain pay increases of 9 and 10 percent (Abelshauser 1984), 
hardly consistent with the picture of restraint. If anything, successful wage restraint 
began having its effects only in the mid-1950s, at a time when economic recovery at 
fast rates had consolidated. 
  What markets could not deliver, governments sought to provide. In West 
Germany, extensive use was made of Marshall Plan counterpart funds to finance in-
vestment in coal, steel, public utilities, and transport. After the currency reform of 
1948, coal prices had continued to be fixed at levels far below cost, and the same held 
true for electricity and railway transport prices; this was a deliberate policy to keep 
production costs low and to boost consumer purchasing power. Rents were kept artifi-
cially low, and heavy federal subsidies were provided for residential construction. 
This is hardly in line with the traditional praise for Erhard’s free-market policy, and 
has induced writers to question Erhard’s actual influence on policy (Abelshauser, 
1984) as well as the pro-market character of his creeds (Laitenberger, 1986).  
  Similar continuity was evident in Britain. Early industrialization had be-
queathed a myriad of small, craft-based trade unions. Their number and the autonomy 
of shop stewards on the factory floor frustrated efforts to achieve the industry-wide, 
much less economy-wide, coordination of bargaining. None of this changed as a result 
of World War II. With scores of unions squabbling over their members’ shop-floor 
rights, work rules proved difficult to modify. Bean and Crafts (1996) analyze TFP 
growth in 137 British industries: they find that the presence of multiple unions sig-
                                                 
37  The act laid the administration of this levy in the hands of the entrepreneurs’ associations, 
again strengthening the informal cartels that allied legislation had sought to abolish (Abel-
shauser, 1984).   31
nificantly depressed TFP growth, with multiple-union workplaces exhibiting annual 
TFP growth as much as one percentage point lower than that achieved by single-union 
workplaces.
38 In this environment, attempts to import American-style mass produc-
tion methods under the aegis of the Anglo-American Council on Productivity (AACP) 
had little impact on growth (Crafts 1995). Unions and employers agreed that neither 
restrictive practices nor work rules were fair game for investigation by the AACP.  
  The labor market implications of these policies were mixed. Aggregate labor-
market statistics for the two countries paint sharply contrasting pictures (Table 7). 
British unemployment was low. Many feared a postwar surge in unemployment like 
that which had followed World War I, but their expectations were disappointed. Be-
tween 1945 and 1951 unemployment averaged an astonishingly low 1.5 percent. For 
the remainder of the decade the annual average rate never once crept above 2 percent. 
  Germany, on the other hand, entered the 1950s with unemployment close to 10 
percent. Only toward the end of the decade had German unemployment rates attained 
British levels. The persistence of high unemployment during the first years was itself 
a consequence of a very high influx of refugees after World War II. Therefore, it is 
not an indication of failing labor market institutions. However, the initially high level 
of unemployment and its subsequent decline may have contributed to an initially low 
but increasing bargaining power of trade unions. All this leads us to conclude that the 
contrasting structure of labor relations in the two countries may have mattered less for 
the course of the first postwar decade than is commonly supposed.
39  
                                                 
38 Here too there is impressive evidence of institutional continuity: Broadberry and Crafts 
(1992) provide remarkably similar estimates for the interwar years. 
39  In a Nash bargain over the wage rate, unemployment may affect the bargaining position of 
the trade union. Broadberry and Crafts (1996) find evidence of this effect in postwar Brit-
ain. According to Lindlar and Holtfrerich (1997), unit labor costs started to rise at the end 
of the decade, and continued doing so until the labor market was opened to immigration   32
Macroeconomic policies. Many comparisons of the British and German re-
coveries credit superior German growth performance to more stable and prudent mac-
roeconomic policies. The British stereotype is of low savings, budgetary stop-and-go, 
and chronic balance of payments deficits.  The German image, in contrast, is of a 
more cautious and stable macroeconomic stance.  
But Table 7 shows that private savings rates were actually quite similar in the 
two countries. Moreover, in both countries public sector’s contribution to national 
saving was positive. Both countries were capital exporters.
40 The question therefore is 
how two such similar patterns could have produced such different outcomes. The an-
swer is less different postwar policies than different financial inheritances.—
specifically, very different debt/income ratios. West Germany’s started out lower and 
remained below 25 percent until the 1970s. Britain's debt ratio started out at 175 per-
cent and remained higher than Germany’s until the 1990s (Ritschl 1996).   Different 
levels of debt meant different balance-of-payments positions, given similar savings 
rates. The British balance of payments was weak owing to the large amount of service 
due on debt to foreigners, while the German balance of payments benefited from the 
country’s debts having been written down by the currency reform of 1948 and the 
London Agreement of 1953 (Buchheim 1986). Thus, the main difference lay in post-
war debt arrangements which favored Germany, allowing her to accumulate foreign 
currency reserves despite savings rates only marginally different from Britain’s. And 
                                                                                                                                            
from Southern Europe in the 1960s. Hence, to the extent that high initial unemployment 
reinforced the implicit contract trading in wage increases for higher investment, this effect 
became weaker over time. 
40  Commentators have sometimes argued that the country’s propensity to export capital was 
harmful for domestic investment, and also that Germany’s ability to generate current-
account and export surpluses was an important engine of growth. Table 3 reminds the 
reader that these views cannot be true at the same time.   33
that accumulation of reserves freed macroeconomic policy from the constraint im-
posed by the balance of payments. 
  British policymakers were single-minded in their pursuit of output and em-
ployment goals. But every time their policies of aggressive demand stimulus bumped 
up against the balance-of-payments constraint, they were forced to retrench. The re-
sult, it has been widely argued, was an unstable pattern of stop-go policies, which dis-
rupted the process of economic growth. In Germany, where pressing foreign exchange 
constraints were absent, one might expect more stable fiscal policy.  
  But, once again, Table 7 shows that this was not the case. The German gov-
ernment ran a series of surpluses in the 1950s, the proceeds of which were spent in 
subsequent years. This spike in German public saving was caused by the attempt of 
the German government to pour money into a sinking fund for rearmament
41 Sur-
pluses were added to the government’s central bank account and removed from circu-
lation. Soon, however, a grand coalition of politicians determined that a better use of 
these monies was to expand social security, and the government’s account was run 
down. This fiscal conduct was criticized at the time for its procyclicality (Musgrave 
1956).
42 None of this is consistent with the stereotype of a stabilizing fiscal policy. 
What really seems to have mattered for Germany’s fiscal system was the absence of 
large interest burdens on the public budget that allowed Germany to keep tax rates 
low and insulated the public budget from balance-of-payments pressures. Thus, the 
two countries’ macroeconomic policies seem to explain less than might be supposed. 
 
                                                 
41 This arrangement came to be known as the “Juliusturm.”The original Juliusturm was a 
tower in the fortress of Spandau near Berlin where Imperial Germany had hoarded French 
gold paid as reparations after the Franco-Prussian War of 1871. 
42  Analyzing German full employment budget surpluses, Berger (1997) similarly finds that 
the “Juliusturm” hoarding had strong procyclical effects.    34
6. Conclusion 
  Between 1950 and 1960, output in West Germany grew at an average of 8 
percent per year, much faster than in earlier German history and faster than in Europe 
as a whole. This paper has reviewed popular explanations for this out-performance, 
identifying a kernel of truth in each of them. But of the convergence, structural 
change and postwar shock hypotheses, both theory and evidence suggest that the third 
factor was the most important. Output per capita converged back to its steady state 
faster than the capital/labor ratio, not three times slower as suggested by the standard 
neoclassical model, which suggests that neoclassical convergence explains only a 
fraction of observed growth in this period. The additional fillip to growth due to the 
reallocation of labor from agriculture to industry was even smaller. Far and away the 
most important of these three factors was the collapse of output in the final phases of 
the war and immediately thereafter. This was reflected in the concomitant collapse 
and subsequently in a fast recovery of total factor productivity. Given that capacity 
had not fallen, indeed that it continued to rise in the 1950s, there was scope for Ger-
many to grow rapidly by closing this output and TFP gap. 
  All this presumes the institutional capability to restore normal levels of capac-
ity utilization and growth. This brings us to the fourth explanation for the 
Wirtschaftswunder, namely the institutional shake-up that supposedly eliminated rent-
seeking coalitions, creating scope for rapid growth. Here the evidence suggests that 
the Germany economy in fact remained tightly regulated, both absolutely and relative 
to more slowly-growing economies like Britain. The postwar model of Rhenish capi-
talism drew heavily on a regulatory model established in the early and mid-1930s, 
complemented by an improved version of the corporatist model of collective wage 
bargaining that had prevailed in the Weimar Republic before 1933. While questions 
have been raised about the sustainability of this model in recent years, it provided ac-  35
countability and predictability in the 1950s and enabled the German economy to grow 
back to its historical trend after heavy disruptions in the aftermath of World War II. 
None of this is to imply that policy did not matter. Socialist alternatives to the 
German model were considered and could have been followed. The German labor 
movement and its moderate political wing began moving away from their socialist 
leanings only in the late 1950s. Inspired by organized Catholicism, German conserva-
tism in the postwar period favored corporatist organization and heavy regulation over 
an adjustment to market forces, leaving a lasting imprint on West Germany’s socio-
economic system of Rhenish capitalism, as this model has come to be called. As we 
have argued, this model was by no means a radical departure from German traditions. 
If there is anything surprising about Germany’s postwar setup, it is the high degree of 
institutional continuity and the absence of any radical turn in policy.   36
References 
Abelshauser, Werner, 1985, Wirtschaftsgeschichte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 
1945–1980 (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp). 
______, 1981, „Wiederaufbau vor dem Marshallplan. Westeuropas Wachstumschancen 
und die Wirtschaftsordnungspolitik in der zweiten Hälfte der vierziger Jahre“, 
Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte 29, pp. 545-578. 
______, 1984, Der Ruhrkohlenberghau seit 1945 (Munich: Beck). 
______, 1975, Wirtschaft in Westdeutschland 1945–1948 (Stuttgart: DVA). 
Abramovitz, Moses, 1986, “Catching Up, Forging Ahead and Falling Behind,” Journal of 
Economic History, vol. 46, pp. 385–406. 
Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson, and James Robinson, 2005. “The Rise of Europe: At-
lantic Trade, Institutional Change, and Economic Growth,” American Economic 
Review 95, pp. 546-579. 
Adamsen, Heiner R., 1981. Investitionshilfe für die Ruhr. Wiederaufbau, Vebände und 
Soziale Marktwirtschaft 1948-1952 (Wuppertal: Hammer). 
Alford, Bernard, 1988, British Economic Performance, 1945–1975 (Basingstoke: Mac-
millan).  
Anderson, Dennis LeRoy, 1987. The Academy for German Law: 1933-1944 (Garland, 
New York). 
Barkai, Avram, 1990, Nazi Economics: Ideology, Theory, and Policy (Oxford: Berg). 
Barnett, Correlli, 1986, The Audit of War: The Illusion of Britain as a Great Power (Lon-
don: Macmillan). 
Barro, Robert, 1999. “Notes on Growth Accounting,” Journal of Economic Growth 4, pp. 
119-137. 
Baumol, William, Batey Blackman, and Edward Wolff, 1989, Productivity and American 
Leadership (Cambridge: MIT Press). 
Bean, Charles, and Nicholas Crafts, 1996, “British Economic Growth since 1945: Relati-
ve Economic Decline … and Renaissance?” in Nicholas Crafts and Gianni To-
niolo (eds.), Economic Growth in Europe since 1945 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press), pp. 131–172. 
Bel, Germa, 2006, Against the mainstream: Nazi privatization in 1930s Germany, Work-
ing Papers in Economics 162, Universitat de Barcelona, Espai de Recerca en 
Economia.   37
Berger, Helge, 1997, Konjunkturpolitik im Wirtschaftswunder: Handlungsspielräume und 
Verhaltensmuster von Bundesbank und Regierung in den 1950er Jahren 
(Tübingen: Mohr). 
______, and Albrecht Ritschl, 1995, “Germany and the Political Economy of the Mar-
shall Plan, 1947-52: A Re-Revisionist View,” in Barry Eichengreen (ed.), 
Europe's Postwar Recovery (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), pp. 199–
245. 
Berghahn, Volker, 1986, The Americanization of West German Industry 1945–1973 
(Leamington Spa: Berg). 
_______, and Sigurd Vitols (eds.), 2006, Gibt es einen deutschen Kapitalismus? 
Frankfurt/Main: Campus. 
Birkenfeld, Werner, 1964. Der Synthetische Treibstoff, 1933-1945; ein Beitrag zur 
nationalsozialistischen Wirtschafts- und Rüstungspolitik (Göttingen: Muster-
Schmidt). 
Borchardt, Knut, 1976, “Wachstum und Wechsellagen 1914/1970”, in: Hermann Aubin 
and Wolfgang Zorn, eds.: Handbuch der deutschen Wirtschafts- und 
Sozialgeschichte (Klett-Cotta, Stuttgart). 
______, 1977 [1991], “Trends, Cycles, Structural Breaks, Chance: What Determines 
Twentieth Century German Economic History?” in idem, Perspectives on Modern 
German Economic History and Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 
pp. 84-107. 
Booth, Alan, Joseph Melling, and Christoph Dartmann, 1997, “Institutions and Economic 
Growth: The Politics of Productivity in West Germany, Sweden and the United 
Kingdom, 1945-1955,” Journal of Economic History 57, pp. 416–444. 
Broadberry, Stephen, 1993, “Manufacturing and the Convergence Hypothesis: What the 
Long-Run Data Show,” Journal of Economic History 53, pp. 772–795. 
______, 1994, “Why Was Unemployment in Postwar Britain So Low?” Bulletin of Eco-
nomic Research 46, pp. 241–261. 
______, 1997, “Anglo-German Productivity Differences, 1870-1990: A Sectoral Analy-
sis,” European Review of Economic History 1, pp. 247–267. 
______, 2006, “Market Services and the Productivity Race, 1850-2000: Britain, the 
United States and Germany”, mimeo, University of Warwick. 
______, Stephen, and Nicholas Crafts, 1992, “Britain’s Productivity Gap in the 1930s: 
Some Neglected Factors,” Journal of Economic History 52, pp. 531–558.   38
______, and ______, 1996, “British Economic Policy and Industrial Performance in the 
Early Postwar Period,” Business History 38, pp. 65–91. 
______, and Albrecht Ritschl, 1995, “Real Wages, Productivity and Unemployment in 
Britain and Germany During the 1920s,” Explorations in Economic History 32, 
pp. 327–349. 
______, and Karin Wagner, 1996, “Human Capital and Productivity in Manufacturing 
During the Twentieth Century: Britain, Germany and the United States,” in Bart 
van Ark and Nicholas Crafts (eds.), Quantitative Aspects of Postwar European 
Economic Growth (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), pp. 244-270. 
Budraß, Lutz, 1998, Flugzeugindustrie und Luftrüstung in Deutschland 1918–1945 
(Düsseldorf: Droste). 
Buchheim, Christoph, 1990, Die Wiedereingliederung Westdeutschlands in die Weltwirt-
schaft 1945-1958 (Munich: Oldenbourg). 
______, 1988, “Die Währungsreform 1948 in Westdeutschland,” Vierteljahreshefte fuer 
Zeitgeschichte 36, pp. 189–231. 
______, and Jonas Scherner, 2006, “The Role of Private Property in the Nazi Economy: 
The Case of Industry,” Journal of Economic History 66, 390-416. 
Cairncross, Alec, 1985, Years of Recovery: British Economic Policy, 1945-1951 (London: 
Methuen). 
Carlin, Wendy, 1996, “West German Growth and Institutions,” in Nicholas Crafts and 
Gianni Toniolo (eds.), Economic Growth in Europe since 1945 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press), pp. 455–497. 
Connolly, Tracey (2000), “Irish Workers in Britain during World War Two,” in Brian 
Girvin and Geoffrey Roberts (eds), Ireland and the Second World War: Politics, 
Society and Remembrance (Dublin, Four Courts Press), pp.121-132. 
Crafts, Nicholas, 1987 “Revealed Comparative Advantage in Manufacturing, 1899-
1950,” European Journal of Economic History 18, pp. 127-137. 
______, 1995, “You’ve Never Had it so Good? British Economic Policy and Perform-
ance, 1945-60,” in Barry Eichengreen (ed.), Europe’s Postwar Recovery (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press), pp. 246–270. 
______, and Terence Mills, 1996, “Europe’s Golden Age: An Econometric Investiga-
tion,” in Bart van Ark and Nicholas Crafts (eds.), Quantitative Aspects of Postwar 
Economic Growth (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), pp. 415-431.   39
______, and Gianni Toniolo, 1996, “Postwar Growth: An Overview,” in Nicholas Crafts 
and Gianni Toniolo (eds.), Economic Growth in Europe Since 1945 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press), pp. 1–37. 
Deutsche Bundesbank, (ed.), 1976, Deutsches Geld- und Bankwesen in Zahlen, 1876-
1975 (Frankfurt: Knapp). 
Denison, Edward, 1968, “Economic Growth,” in Richard Caves (ed.), Britain’s Economic 
Prospects (London: Allen and Unwin), pp. 231-278. 
Dow, John, 1964, The Management of the British Economy 1945–1960 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press). 
Dumke, Rolf, 1990, “Reassessing the Wirtschaftswunder: Reconstruction and Postwar 
Growth In West Germany in an international Context,” Oxford Bulletin of Eco-
nomics and Statistics 52, pp. 451-491. 
Edwards, Jeremy, and Klaus Fischer, 1994, Banks, Finance and Investment in Germany 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). 
Eichengreen, Barry, 1993, Reconstructing Europe’s Trade and Payments: The European 
Payments System (Manchester: Manchester University Press). 
______, 1996, “Institutions and Economic Growth: Europe After World War II,” in 
Nicholas Crafts and Gianni Toniolo (eds), Economic Growth in Europe Since 
1945 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), pp. 38–70. 
Erhard, Ludwig, 1960, Wohlstand für alle (Düsseldorf: Econ). 
Eucken, Walter, 1940. Die Grundlagen der Nationalökonomie (Fischer, Jena). 
Feinstein, Charles H., 1972. National Income, Expenditure and Output of the United 
Kingdom 1855-1965 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). 
Feldman, Gerald, 2001, Allianz and the German Insurance Business, 1933-1945 (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press). 
Flanagan, Robert, David Soskice, and Lloyd Ulman, 1974, Unionism, Economic Stabili-
zation, and Incomes Policy (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution). 
Floud, Roderick, and Donald McCloskey (eds.), 1994, The Economic History of Britain 
Since 1700, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). 
Gehrig, Gerhard, 1961, “Eine Zeitreihe für den Sachkapitalbestand und die 
Investitionen,” in Gerhard Gehrig, ed.: Bestimmungsfaktoren der deutschen 
Produktion (IFO-Studien 7). 
Giersch, Herbert, Karl-Heinz Paqué, and Holger Schmieding, 1992, The Fading Miracle. 
Four Decades of Market Economy in Germany (Cambridge: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press).   40
Gillingham, John, 1991, Coal, Steel, and the Rebirth of Europe, 1945–1955 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press). 
Ghosal, Virek, 1991, “Demand Uncertainty and the Capital-Labor Ratio: Evidence from 
the U.S. Manufacturing Sector,” Review of Economics and Statistics, 76, pp. 157–
161. 
Glyn, Andrew, and Bob Sutcliffe, 1972, British Capitalism, Workers, and the Profits 
Squeeze (London: Penguin). 
Grunenberg, Nina, 2006. Die Wundertäter. Netzwerke der deutschen Wirtschaft 1942-
1966 (Siedler, Berlin). 
Harris, Nigel, 1972, Competition and the Corporate Society: British Conservatives, the 
State and Industry, 1945–1964 (London: Methuen). 
Hentschel, Volker, 1996, Ludwig Erhard: ein Politikerleben (Munich: Olzog). 
Herbst, Ludolf, 1982. Der Totale Krieg und die Ordnung der Wirtschaft. Die 
Kriegswirtschaft im Spannungsfeld von Politik, Ideologie und Propaganda 1939-
1945 (Deutsche Verlagsanstalt, Stuttgart). 
Hoffmann, Walther, 1965, Das Wachstum der deutschen Wirtschaft seit der Mitte des 19. 
Jahrhunderts (Berlin: Springer). 
______, and J. Heinz Müller, 1959, Das deutsche Volkseinkommen 1851-1957 
(Tuebingen: Mohr). 
Holtfrerich, Carl-Ludwig, 1995, “Die Deutsche Bank vom Zweiten Weltkrieg über die 
Besatzungsherrschaft zur Rekonstruktion 1945-1957,” in Lothar Gall et al., Die 
Deutsche Bank 1870-1995 (Munich: Beck), pp. 409-478. 
James, Harold, 1995, “Die Deutsche Bank und die Diktatur,” in Lothar Gall et al., Die 
Deutsche Bank 1870-1995 (Munich: Beck), pp. 315-408. 
James, Harold, 2001. The Deutsche Bank and the Nazi Economic War Against the Jews 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). 
Jánossy, Ferenc, 1969, The End of the Economic Miracle (New York: ISAP). 
Karlsch, Rainer, 1993. Allein bezahlt? Die Reparationsleistungen der SBZ/DDR 1945 
(Berlin: Links). 
Kindleberger, Charles P., 1967, Europe’s Postwar Growth (New York: Oxford University 
Press). 
van de Klundert, Theo, and Anton van Schaik, 1993, “On the Historical Continuity of the 
Process of Economic Growth,” in Bart van Ark and Nicholas Crafts (eds.), Quan-
titative Aspects of Postwar European Economic Growth (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press), pp. 388-414.   41
Kluge, Ulrich, 1988, Vierzig Jahre Agrarpolitik in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 
(Hamburg: Parey). 
Koslowski, Peter (ed.), 1998, The Social Market Economy: Theory and Ethics of the Eco-
nomic Order (New York: Springer). 
Krause, Lawrence B., 1968, “British Trade Performance,” in Richard E. Caves (ed.), 
Britain’s Economic Prospects (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution), pp. 
198–228. 
Krengel, Rolf, 1958, Anlagevermögen, Produktion und Beschäftigung der Industrie im 
Gebiet der Bundesrepublik von 1924 bis 1956 (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot). 
Laitenberger, Volkhard, 1986, Ludwig Erhard. Der Nationalökonom als Politiker 
(Göttingen: Muster-Schmidt). 
Lindlar, Ludger, and Carl-Ludwig Holtfrerich, 1997, “Geography, Exchange Rates, and 
Trade Structures: Germany’s Export Performance Since the 1950s,” European 
Review of Economic History 1, pp. 217–246. 
Maddison, Angus, 1991, Dynamic Forces in Capitalist Development (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press). 
______, 1995, Monitoring the World Economy, 1820-1992 (Paris: OECD). 
______, 2003. The World Economy: Historical Statistics (Paris: OECD). 
Mankiw, Gregory, Paul Romer, and Philippe Weil, 1992, “A Contribution to the Empirics 
of Economic Growth,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 107, pp. 407–437. 
Manz, Mathias, 1968, Stagnation und Aufschwung in der französischen Besatzungszone 
von 1945 bis 1948, (Ph.D. Diss., University of Mannheim). 
Melzer, Manfred, 1980, Anlagevermögen, Produktion und Beschäftigung der Industrie im 
Gebiet der DDR von 1936 bis 1978 sowie Schätzung des künftigen 
Angebotspotentials, Berlin: Duncker & Humblot (DIW Beiträge zur Struktur-
forschung 59). 
Mierzejewski, Alfred C., 2004. Ludwig Erhard. A Biography (Chapel Hill: University of 
North Carolina Press). 
Mitchell, Brian, 1990, British Historical Statistics (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press). 
______, 2003, International Historical Statistics: Europe 1750 – 2000 (London: Macmil-
lan).  
Mollin, Gerhard, 1988, Montankonzerne und Drittes Reich (Goettingen: Vandenhoeck & 
Ruprecht).   42
Musgrave, Richard, 1956, “Steuerpolitik und Konjunktur,” Wirtschaftsdienst 6, pp. 309–
312. 
Olson, Mancur, 1982, The Rise and Decline of Nations (New Haven: Yale University 
Press). 
______, 1996, “The Varieties of Eurosclerosis: The Rise and Fall of Nations Since 1982,” 
in Nicholas Crafts and Gianni Toniolo (eds.), Economic Growth in Europe Since 
1945 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), pp.73-94. 
Overmans, Rüdiger, 1999, Deutsche militärische Verluste im Zweiten Weltkrieg (Munich: 
Oldenbourg). 
Paqué, Karl-Heinz, 1994, “The Causes of Slumps and Miracles: A Critical Evaluation of 
Olsonian Views on the German Economic Miracle,” CEPR Discussion Paper No. 
981. 
______, 1996, “Why the 1950s and Not the 1920s? Olsonian and Non-Olsonian Interpre-
tations of Two Decades of German Economic History,” in Nicholas Crafts and 
Gianni Toniolo (eds), Economic Growth in Europe Since 1945 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press), pp. 95–106. 
Petzina, Dietmar, 1968. Autarkiepolitik im Dritten Reich (Stuttgart : Deutsche 
Verlagsanstalt). 
Plumpe, Werner, 1987, Vom Plan zum Markt: Wirtschaftsverwaltung und Unternehmer-
verbände in der britischen Zone (Duesseldorf: Schwann). 
Price, Sidney, and D. Sanders, 1994, “Economic Competence, Rational Expectations, and 
Government Popularity in Postwar Britain,” Manchester School 42, pp. 296–312. 
Ritschl, Albrecht, 1992, “Die Wirtschaftspolitik des Dritten Reichs: Ein Überblick,” in 
Karl-Dietrich Bracher et al. (eds.), Deutschland 1933-1945. Neue Studien zur 
nationalsozialistischen Herrschaft (Duesseldorf: Droste), pp. 118-134. 
______, 1996a, “Sustainability of High Public Debt: what the Historical Record Shows,” 
Swedish Economic Policy Review 3, pp. 175–198. 
_____, 1996b, “Aufstieg und Niedergang der DDR-Wirtschaft 1945-1989,” Jahrbuch für 
Wirtschaftsgeschichte 2, pp.11-46. 
______, 2005, “Der späte Fluch des Dritten Reichs: Pfadabhängigkeiten in der 
Entstehung der bundesdeutschen Wirtschaftsordnung,“Perspektiven der 
Wirtschaftspolitik 6, pp. 151-170. 
______, and Mark Spoerer, 1997, “Das Bruttosozialprodukt in Deutschland nach den 
amtlichen Volkseinkommens- und Sozialproduktsstatistiken 1901-1995,” 
Jahrbuch für Wirtschaftsgeschichte 2, pp. 11-37.   43
Robertson, Dennis, 1954, Britain in the World Economy (London: Allen & Unwin). 
Romer, Paul, 1987. “Crazy Explanations of the Productivity Slowdown,” NBER Macro-
economics Annual (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press).  
Schenk, Catherine R., 1994, Britain and the Sterling Area (London: Routledge). 
Sicsic, Pierre and Charles Wyplosz, 1996. “France 1945-92,” in Nicholas Crafts and 
Gianni Toniolo (eds), Economic Growth in Europe Since 1945 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press), pp. 210-239. 
Solow, Robert, 1957, “Technical Change and the Aggregate Production Function,” Re-
view of Economics and Statistics 39, pp. 312-320. 
Spoerer, Mark, and Jochen Fleischhacker, 2002, “Forced Laborers in Nazi Germany: 
Categories, Numbers, and Survivors,” Journal of Interdisciplinary History 33, pp. 
169-204. 
Temin, Peter, 2002, “The Golden Age of European Growth Reconsidered,” European Re-
view of Economic History 6, pp.3-22. 
Temple, Jonathan, 2001, “Structural Change and Europe’s Golden Age,” unpublished 
manuscript, University of Bristol. 
United Nations, 1964, Economic Survey of Europe in 1961, Part 2: Some Factors in Eco-
nomic Growth in Europe During the 1950s (Geneva: United Nations). 
Weaver, F., 1950, “Taxation and Redistribution of Income in the United Kingdom,” Re-
view of Economics and Statistics 32, pp. 201–213. 
Wellhoener, Volker, 1989, Großbanken und Großindustrie im Kaiserreich (Göttingen: 
Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht). 





Table 1  
 
Comparative levels of productivity and agricultural employment shares, 1870-1973 
 
  Y / L (UK=100)    K / L (UK=100)  Agricultural employment and income shares 
Year        Year             Germany                    Britain 
      labor income labor income
      1907/11  35.2 12.7 11.8 6.3
1913  72.2    102     1925  30.5 8.6 7.8 4.9
1929  70.0    79     1933  28.2 8.4 6.4 4.8
1938  75.8    88     1938/39  25.0 8.6 5.4 3.9
1950  61.7    71     1950  22.2 6.1 5.0 4.1
1960  95.5      1960  13.3 4.0
1973  109.3      1973    7.1  2.9
Sources:  Output per capita: 
Capital/labor ratio:  





Germany: Calculated from Statistisches Jahrbuch fuer das Deutsche Reich, various issues; 
Deutsche Bundesbank (1976) 
    Britain: Calculated from Maddison (1991), Feinstein (1972) 
  
Table 2 
Comparisons of output growth and its determinants, 1960-1973 
Percentage growth per year 
        
  Output Y Capital K  Labor L Y/L  K/L  TFP I  TFP II 
              
(a) 1950-1960 
W. Germany  7.96 5.66 1.02 6.94 4.64 5.39 3.85
Britain  2.85 3.90 0.55 2.30 3.35 1.19 0.07
(b) 1960-1973 
W. Germany  3.45 6.50 -0.81 4.26 7.31 1.82 -0.61
Britain  3.16 5.32 -0.69 3.85 6.01 1.85 -0.16
Sources:  Calculated from Maddison (1991, 1995), Ritschl and Spoerer (1997).  
Methods:  Approximate TFP growth:  TFP  I = Y/L – 1/3* K/L 











Gross Capital Stock and Coal Output in Germany and Britain across World War II 
(1936 = 100) 
 
           
  Germany (Postwar Territory, at 1936 prices)  Britain (at 1938 prices) 
           
  Mining and Manufacturing  Aggregate Economy (West)  Aggregate Economy 




















                  
 (i)  (ii)    (iii)   (iv)  (v) (vi)  (vii) (viii) (ix) (x) 
              
1938   118     107  103 102  104.16 104.16 104.16 99 
             
1944 136 106   143       115.21 106.41 84 
             
1946 116  46   102       118.78 107.05 83 
1947   61         108.57 121.77 108.57 86 
1948 113  75   103       110.46 90 
1950 122  96   107   107  92 95  115.15 95 
        
        
(i)    West Germany and West Berlin, Krengel (1958) 
(ii,x)  Mitchell (2003), Abelshauser (1975). 
(iii)    East Germany and East Berlin, Melzer (1980) 
(iv-vi)  West Germany, Gehrig (1961) 
(vii)  Feinstein (1972), Table 43.  
(viii)  Calculated from Feinstein (1972), Table 40. 
(ix)  Linear interpolation of (vii) by (viii).  
   Table  4 
 
Population in Germany 
1939-1950
 
- millions - 
 
 
      
   1937  territory  1942  territory
* 1946  territory
* 
        
        
1939  Total   67.8  99  59.74 
 West      42.09 
        
        
1944 Extrapolation from 
1939 census (i) 
Total   69.9  99   
 West     42.44 
Slave laborers (ii)  Total     8.3   
 West       3.85 
Servicemen abroad (iii)  Total    18.1   
 West        8.4 
        
        
Total   1944        89     
West       37.89 
Total   1946        64.07 
West       45.71 
        
Total   1950        68.23 
West       49.84 
        
        
Sources and Methods:    Data for 1937 borders: Maddison (1991). 
  (i)   Statistisches Handbuch von Deutschland 
 (ii)  Spoerer and Fleischhacker (2002).    
 (iii)  Overmans  (1999).   
  *  1942 territory includes Germany in 1937 borders, annexed Austria, as well as 
annexed parts of Czechia, France, Poland, Lithuania, and Yugoslavia. 
“Protektorat” part of Czechia and “Generalgouvernmenent” part of Poland not 
included. 
  **1946 territory includes Germany in 1937 borders, less territories annexed by 
Poland and Soviet Union, and less Sarre region. Figures exclude former slave 





Figure 1: Growth of GDP Per Capita in Britain and Germany, 1901-1993



































Sources: see legend to Table 5.  
Table 5  
 
Comparisons of output growth and its determinants, 1929-1950 
    Average percentage growth, annualized
*    
  Output Y  Capital K  Labor L Y/L K/L TFP I  TFP II
             
(a) 1913-1929    
Germany  0.63 -0.05 -0.17 0.8 0.12 0.76  0.72
Germany (rev.)  0.59  -0.05 -0.17 0.76 0.12 0.72  0.68
Britain 0.71  1.51 -0.74 1.45 2.25 0.71  -0.04
(a) 1929-1938    
Germany  3.78 1.74 1.36 2.42 0.38 2.29  2.17
Germany (rev.)  3.39 1.74 1.36 2.03 0.38 1.90  1.78
Britain  1.89 2.20 0.96 0.93 1.24 0.52  0.11
(b) 1938-1944    
W. Germany  3.67 2.87 -2.34 6.01 5.21 4.28  2.54
Germany/ 
Greater Germany 
8.36 5.81  4.45 3.74 1.31 3.30  2.86
Britain  3.36 0.36 -1.10 4.52 1.48 4.01  3.51
(c) 1944-1946     
 
W. Germany  -37.6  -8.8 0.09 - 47.4 - 18.6  -41.2  - 39.3
Britain  -4.37 0.30 2.76 -6.94 -2.39 -6.19  -5.44
(d) 1946-1950    
W.Germany 19.9  1.17 2.19 17.74 -1.02 18.08  18.4
Britain 3.75  1.84 1.76 1.96 0.08 1.93  1.91
  Level of Reconstruction in 1950
** 
Indices 1944=100 
W. Germany  80.6  87.1 131.5 59.4 66.2 68.2  78.2
Britain 106.0  108.2 113.2 93.6 95.6 95.0  96.4
    
Sources:  Calculated using data from Feinstein (1972), Maddison (1991, 2003), and Ritschl and Spoerer 
(1997) as described in text. 
Methods:  *Data in growth rates. 
TFP I   = Y/L – (1/3) * K/L 
TFP II  = Y/L – (2/3) * K/L 
 
**Data in levels.    TFP I   = exp[log (Y/L) - (1/3)*log (K/L)] 
                              TFP II   = exp[log (Y/L) - (2/3)*log (K/L)] 
  Rough estimates in italics. 




Convergence of Per-Capita Income in Postwar Europe, 1950-1989 
  Log differences    Annualized growth rates  Growth 
slowdown 
  1950-60    1950-60  1960-70   1970-89    1950-89   
1970-89/ 
1960-70 
C     2.754   
<2.834> 
 1.859   
<1.820> 
   -0.915 
<-0.918> 





    0.023 
<0.071> 
   1.066 
<18.985> 
     1.084 
<42.278> 
     1.035 
<0.071> 
        0.116 
<1.718> 








   
 
    
 
 
    
GAP <1941-1946>         1.198 
<5.015> 
   0.975 
<3.091> 
 
   0.466 
<4.736> 
  0.352 
<2.815> 
   0.009 
<2.608> 
       0.004 
<2.537> 
      0.012 
<2.815> 
       -0.019 
<-4.608> 




  0.099 
<0.821> 
   0.094 
<0.781> 




   -0.006 
<-0.950> 
     -0.026 
<-0.269> 
    -0.003 
<-0.462> 
       -0.011 
<-1.530> 




   0.033 
<2.555> 
    0.034 
<2.638> 
 
  0.141 
<1.927> 
   0.138 
<1.961> 
    0.037 
<1.942> 
      0.018 
<1.927> 
      0.033 
<1.961> 
       -0.028 
<-1.213> 
1960s                     0.005 
<2.057> 
  
1970s             
        0.008 
<3.436> 
  
WEST GERMANY     1.083 
<1.778> 
 





        
R
2  0.614    0.707  0.783     0.805    0.755  0.794  0.727  0.867      0.645       0.549 
N  15   15   15   15     15  15  15   15   45     15  
t statistics in italics                      
  Table 7  
Macroeconomic Performance in Britain and Germany,  1950-1960 
          
 Private  savings 
ratios, per cent 
Public debt/GNP 
ratio, per cent 




 GB  D  GB D GB D GB  D
            
1950  1.3 3.2  193.5 19.7 19.1 7.5 1.3  11.0
1951  1.1 3.2  175.4 17.5 15.2 11.7 1.1  10.4
1952  3.4 5.7  162.7 16.5 8.6 11.6 1.6  9.5
1953  3.6 6.9  152.3 21.6 6.1 13.0 1.5  8.4
1954  3.0 7.4  147.3 23.1 6.6 12.3 1.2  7.6
1955  3.6 6.6  139.1 21.4 11.2 13.7 1.0  5.6
1956  5.3 5.7  128.9 19.9 9.3 13.7 1.1  4.4
1957  4.5 8.0  121.8 19.1 11.3 9.4 1.3  3.7
1958  3.9 8.7  117.6 18.8 12.2 4.6 1.9  3.7
1959  4.8 8.9  112.5 18.2 10.1 5.6 1.9  2.6
1960  6.7 9.0  107.7 17.4 6.0 9.3 1.5  1.3
Sources:  Britain:  Calculated from Mitchell (1990), Feinstein (1972). 
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